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Abstract
We show that a firm’s profits under Cournot oligopoly can be increasing in the
number of firms in the industry if wages are determined by (decentralised)
bargaining in unionised oligopoly. The intuition for the result is that increased
product market competition following an increase in the number of firms is
mirrored by increased labour market rivalry which induces (profit-enhancing) wage
moderation. Whether the price or wage effect dominates depends on the extent of
union bargaining power and the nature of union preferences. If bargaining is
centralized then there is no wage moderation effect and wages are the same
independent of the number of firms, as in the standard model with exogenous factor
costs. A corollary of the results derived is that if the upstream agents are firms rather
than labour unions, then profits are always decreasing in the number of firms, as in
the standard Cournot model.
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21. Introduction
In the standard Cournot model of oligopoly, each firm’s profits
decrease as the number of firms competing in the product market
increases. This gives incumbent firms a clear incentive to deter entry
by new firms. In this paper, we show that when firms’ costs (wages)
are determined by bargaining between (downstream) firms and
(upstream) labour unions in unionised bilateral oligopoly, then the
relationship between firm profits and the number of firms depends on
the relative bargaining power and on union preferences. If unions are
relatively powerful and place relatively great weight on wages over
employment, then an increase in the number of firms in the market
can raise the profits of each firm, reversing the standard Cournot
result.
One implication of this result is that firms in unionized bilateral
oligopoly do not necessarily have incentives to deter entry: a
duopolist’s profits can exceed those of a monopolist, for example. A
corollary of this is that the presence of unions might be associated
with an increase rather than a decrease in product market competition.
Thus, the model identifies a mechanism to counter that analysed in
the classic model of Williamson (1968). A second corollary of our
model is that when the bilateral oligopoly is characterized by upstream
profit-maximising firms – rather than by utility-maximising labour
unions –  the profits of each downstream firm are necessarily falling in
the number of firms, as in the standard model. This is because the
firm-firm bilateral oligopoly can be characterized as a special case of
the union-firm bilateral oligopoly, in which we can show that the
upstream agent’s preferences are such that the implicit weight on the
bargained price is not sufficient to cause profits to increase with firm
numbers.
3As far as we are aware, our finding that each Cournot firm’s profit
can increase with the number of firms is a new result. Naylor (2001)
shows conditions under which industry profits are increasing with the
number of firms in the market, but does not address the issue of the
individual firm’s profit level. It is less surprising that industry profits
can increase with the number of firms. In the related literature on
unionized oligopoly, Dowrick (1989) develops a framework in which
unions act as the upstream agent and shows how the bargained wage
varies with market size, but does not focus on the relationship
between profits and the number of firms. Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
examine a differentiated oligopoly with upstream agents (unions) and
downstream firms, but assume a duopolistic market.1 In the literature
on unions and entry deterrence, the usual approach builds on
Williamson’s (1968) insight that incumbent firms might collude with
unions to enforce industry-wide wage premia in order to deter entry.
Unions are seen as an employer instrument to preserve product
market power. In the model we outline below, it emerges that in the
presence of unions firms might have reduced incentives to deter entry:
in other words, in contrast to the Williamson insight, unions might
have a pro-competitive impact in an otherwise imperfectly competitive
product market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
outline the basic model and in Section 3 we examine how firms’
profits vary with the number of firms. Section 4 addresses the issue of
firm-firm rather than union-firm bilateral oligopoly. Section 5
examines the sensitivity of the results to assumptions regarding the
level at which wage bargaining takes place. Section 6 closes the paper
with conclusions and further remarks.
                                                
1 Similarly, Naylor (1999) considers unionized oligopoly in the context of
international trade and economic integration, but does not allow the number of
firms to vary.
42. The Model
We follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988) in supposing that the
upstream agents are firm-specific trade unions bargaining with firms
over the wage rate. We analyze a non-cooperative two-stage game in
which n identical firms produce an identical good. In the first stage
(the labor market game), each firm independently bargains over its
wage with a local labor union: bargaining is decentralized. The
outcome of the labor market game is described by the solution to the
n union-firm pairs’ sub-game perfect best-reply functions in wages. In
the second stage (the Cournot product market game), each firm sets
its output – given pre-determined wage choices from stage 1 – to
maximize profits. We proceed by backward induction.
 (i) Stage 2: the product market game
Let linear product market demand be written as:
bXap -= , (1)
where å
=
=
n
i
ixX
1
. Profit for the representative firm i can be
written as:
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where iw  is the outcome of the wage bargain for union-firm pair i.
In this short-run analysis, we exclude non-labor costs. We also assume
a constant marginal product of labor, and set this as a numeraire.
Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, differentiation of (2) with
respect to ix  yields the first-order condition for profit maximization
by firm i, from which it is straightforward to derive firm i’s best-reply
function in output space as:
5ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
--= å
¹
=
n
ij
j
jii xbwab
x
12
1
. (3)
Solving across the n first-order conditions, the n best-reply
functions can be re-written as sub-game perfect labor demand
equations. From equation (3) for example, the expression for firm i’s
labour demand is
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It is useful to express firm i’s profits in terms of the vector of all
firms’ wages. Substituting (4) in (2), we obtain
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From (5), it follows that in symmetric equilibrium, with ,wwi =
( )
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where w is the outcome of the Stage 1 wage-bargaining game. We
note that if w is given exogenously (or if unions have no bargaining
power) then, with ww=  in (6), the firm’s profits are falling in n, the
number of firms in the industry, as
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which is the standard Cournot oligopoly result.
 (ii) Stage 1: the labour market game
6We assume that the representative trade union i bargaining with
firm i, has the objective described by the Stone-Geary utility function:
[ ] )1(22 aa --= iii xwwU , (8)
where w denotes the wage which would obtain in a competitive
non-unionised labour market. We choose the quadratic form for the
Stone-Geary utility as this captures the special case of rent
maximisation if 2/1=a .2 Under the assumption of a right-to-manage
model of Nash-bargaining over wages, we write the maximand as:
bb p -= 1iii UB , (9)
where we assume that disagreement payoffs are zero. b
represents the union’s Nash-bargaining power in the asymmetric wage
bargain.
Substituting (4), (6) and (8) in (9) yields
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The first order condition derived from the Nash maximand, (10),
is
i
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2 This form will be convenient for comparison with the case of firm-firm bilateral
oligopoly considered in Section 4 below.
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from which it follows that, in symmetric sub-game perfect
equilibrium,
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Substituting (12) in (6) gives equilibrium firm profits of
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In the next section of the paper, we consider comparative static
properties of the model.
3. Firm profits and the number of firms
We now investigate how the profits of each firm in sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium vary with the number of firms in the market.
Differentiating (13) with respect to n, we obtain
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which is non-negative – implying that firm profits are non-
decreasing in the number of firms – if the following condition is
satisfied:
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From (15), it is clear that firm profits are more likely to be
increasing in the number of firms the larger are both a  and b  and
the smaller is n. If the product of a  and b  is close to unity – for
example, if wages are set by monopoly unions with a strong relative
preference for wages – then the value of n over which firm profits are
increasing in the number of firms is potentially very large. In reality,
the product of a  and b  is likely to be strictly less than one. In the
special case of a rent-maximising union and symmetric Nash wage-
bargaining, for example, both a  and b  are equal to one-half and
hence the product is just one-quarter. In that case, condition (15)
requires that )2( +nn  is less than one-third for firm profits to rise
with n, which cannot be satisfied for 1³n .
We proceed by evaluating (13) for various values of n. We also re-
write (13) as
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where d  denotes the product of a  and b .
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From comparison of (17) and (18), it follows that the profits of
each duopolist exceed that of a monopolist if 3/2>d . That is,
12 =>= nn ii pp if 3/22ˆ => dd , (21)
where 2ˆd is the critical value of d  such that the profit of each of
two firms under n-firm Cournot oligopoly (with n=2) is just equal to
the profit level associated with the case in which n=1. Similarly, we
can show by successive pair-wise comparisons of (18), (19) and (20)
that
23 =>= nn ii pp if 7/63ˆ => dd , (22)
and that
34 =>= nn ii pp if 13/124ˆ => dd . (23)
Indeed, it can be demonstrated that the critical level of d  is always
less than one: implying that for sufficiently high d , an increase in n
always leads to an increase in firm profits. We can show this by
evaluating (16) at the value of Nn=  and at the value of 1+= Nn
and comparing. It is straightforward to show that the value of the
individual firm’s profits when 1+= Nn  exceeds profits when Nn=
if and only if ndd ˆ> , where ndˆ is strictly less than unity n" . In
reality, however, d  is unlikely ever to be sufficiently high that firm
profits increase in n over and above the values considered explicitly
in conditions (21) through (23).
Figure 1 plots (17) through (20) in ( ip ,d )-space and uses (21)
through (23) to demonstrate the critical values of d  at which the
maximal values of profits-per-firm shift with the number of firms.
Figure 1: Firm profits against d , for selected n.
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Figure 2 represents (21) through (23) in (a , b )-space to depict the
combinations of a  and b  which produce iso-profit contours for
successive increments in the value of n. In Region A, for example, all
combinations of a  and b  lie below the iso-profit schedule which
satisfies (17) and (18) simultaneously. In this region, then, a
monopolist’s profits always dominate the profits-per-firm associated
with any n>1. Conversely, in Region B, each firm in a duopoly
market earns profits which exceed those of the monopolist. Finally,
Region C represents combinations of a  and b  such that profits-per-
firm are maximized when there are three firms competing in the
Cournot oligopoly.
Figure 2: Iso-profits curves for successive increments in n.
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What is the intuition for our result that the profits-per-firm
increase in the number of firms in the market if abd =  is sufficiently
high and n sufficiently low? In the standard oligopoly model, an
increase in the number of firms unambiguously reduces profits-per-
firm through increased product market competition which reduces
product price. We can see this mechanism working in the model of
bilateral oligopoly developed in this paper. We substitute (4) in (1) and
solve for the equilibrium: this gives
( )nwa
n
p +
+
=
1
1
, (24)
where w is given by (12). From (24), it follows that
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Assuming that £
dn
dw
0, as we demonstrate below, it follows from
(25) that 
dn
dp
 must be negative: an increase in n leads to a fall in
product price.
In addition to the profit-reducing effect of the fall in product
price, however, the increase in the number of firms competing in the
market also induces unions to moderate their wage demands. We can
see this from differentiating (12) with respect to n, which yields
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Furthermore, this wage moderation effect captured in (26) is
increasing in the product ab . It is readily shown from (26) that
ddndwd /2 < 0. At one extreme, for example if 0=ab , then there is
no wage moderation effect associated with an increase in the number
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of firms: that is, there can be no wage moderation effect if unions
exert no influence on the wage, as is implied if 0=ab .
Thus the presence of unions with influence over wages
induces a (profit-enhancing) wage moderation effect to accompany the
(profit-damaging) price-reducing effect of an increase in n. Which
effect dominates depends both on the product ab  – as shown in (26)
– and on the size of n itself. To see this, consider (25) once more. As
n becomes very large, the fraction n/( n+1) tends to one, implying
that 
dn
dp
 tends to equal 
dn
dw
 minus the term in square brackets. Hence,
for sufficiently large n the price effect dominates the wage effect. For
small enough n, however, the fraction n/( n+1) in (25) is sufficiently
less than one that 
dn
dw
 exceeds 
dn
dp
 and the wage moderation effect
dominates, causing an increase in n to raise profits-per-firm.
Entry deterrence
Following Williamson (1968), unions have been characterized as a
potential instrument with which incumbent firms can deter further
market entry. In the standard Cournot oligopoly model, with profits-
per-firm unambiguously decreasing in the number of firms in the
market, there is a clear incentive for firms to attempt to restrict entry.
But in the unionized oligopoly framework we have developed in the
current paper, the very presence of unions with influence over wages
leads to the possibility that, at least for small n, profits-per-firm
increase with n. Thus, if (decentralised) unions have sufficient
influence over wages, a single-firm monopolist might have incentives
to encourage rather than to deter entry by one or more firms.
Alternatively, the presence of influential firms might induce an
15
incumbent monopolist toward a multi-divisional structure with
distinct plants operating as if in competition with one another.
4. Firms as upstream agents
Suppose that the upstream agent is not a utility-maximising trade
union but is a profit-maximising firm with the objective function
( ) iiUi xww -=p , (27)
where  w  represents the upstream firm’s fixed input price and iw
now denotes the price of the intermediate product sold by upstream
firms to their downstream firm pair: bargaining is still assumed to be
locally decentralized with an equal number of upstream and
downstream agents.3 Then the firm-firm Nash bargain over the
intermediate product price solves
bb pp -= 1iUi
F
i
B . (28)
Formally, this problem is equivalent to that described in equations
(10) through (13) above, with the implicit value of a  set at one-half.
Hence, even in the extreme case in which upstream firms have all the
bargaining power, so that b =1, the implicit value of the product
abd =  is never greater than one-half. Thus, from condition (21) –
and the graphic representations in Figures 1 and 2 – it follows that
downstream firm profits are never higher than in the case of
monopoly when upstream and downstream agents are both
characterised as profit-maximising firms.
                                                
3 This assumption is more plausible in the union-firm case where the existence of
the union can be thought of as arising as an institutional response to the existence of
the firm. A similar story to explain a one-to-one matching between the number of
upstream and downstream agents in the case of firm-firm bargaining is less
convincing.
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5. Centralisation of wage bargaining
In the basic union-firm model outlined in Section 3, we assumed
explicitly that wage bargaining occurs at the decentralized level of the
individual union-firm pair. The extent to which wage bargaining is
decentralized or is centralized at either the industry or economy-wide
level varies across countries and across time. The classic
macroeconomic work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) has exploited
variation across countries in the level at which wage bargaining takes
place in order to infer the nature of a relationship between the level of
centralization and a country’s macroeconomic performance. It has
been argued that industry-level wage bargaining produces the worst
possible outcome because it fails to internalize potential adverse
externalities associated with union-firm wage bargaining. In contrast, it
is argued that both fully decentralized bargaining and fully centralized
bargaining force bargaining agents to internalize wage externalities and
hence yield efficient outcomes.
Consider the basic model of Section 3, but incorporating the
assumption that all unions and firms negotiate jointly over the level of
wages. Then the Nash maximand defined in (9) becomes
( ) ( ) bb p -åå= 1UC
i
B , (29)
where åp  is the sum of the individual firms’ profits – given by
(6) – and åU  is the sum over the unions’ utility functions – given by
(8). In the Nash maximand, it is assumed that all bargained wages will
be equal: thus, wwi =  by assumption. Substituting this and the sum
over (4), (6) and (8) in (29) yields the Nash centralised wage-bargaining
maximand:
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The first order condition derived from the centralized-bargaining
Nash maximand is then
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from which it follows that, in symmetric equilibrium,
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which is independent of n, the number of firms in the industry.
It follows that in the case of centralized bargaining, there is no
wage moderation effect associated with an increase in n. This lies
behind Calmfors-Driffill (1988) and related analyses (see also Moene,
Wallerstein and Hoel, 1993). With perfect competition and
decentralized bargaining, unions have no effect on wages: all wage
externality effects are internalized. To see this within our model, let n
become very large: then the bargained wage given by (13) tends to the
competitive non-union level, w . With centralized (industry-level)
bargaining, in contrast, even with large n, the wage will be set above
the competitive level, as shown in (32). Under decentralized
bargaining, a wage externality arises only with the introduction of
imperfect competition, represented by a falling and finite value of n.
Increasing n is associated with increasingly internalizing the negative
wage externality: which is just an alternative interpretation of what we
have previously referred to as the wage moderation effect of
increasing the number of firms in competition.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a simple model of a unionized
oligopoly in order to demonstrate that the standard cornerstone
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Cournot result that profits-per-firm are falling in the number of firms
in the product market is not necessarily valid when firms’ input prices
are determined endogenously through bargaining with upstream
agents (labour unions). We have shown that if wage bargaining is
decentralized (that is, firm-specific), then profits-per-firm will increase
with the number of competing firms if unions care sufficiently about
wages, relative to employment, and possess sufficient bargaining
power. One corollary of this result is that if unions do possess
sufficient influence over wages, it is no longer clear that incumbent
firms will have an incentive to deter market entry.
The intuition for our result is that when wages are determined
endogenously through bargaining, an expansion in the number of
firms has a wage moderation effect which offsets the detrimental
effect on firm profits associated with competitive reductions in
product price. We have shown that the conditions necessary for
unions to have the effect of translating an increase in firm numbers
into an increase in firm profits are not satisfied when the upstream
agents are profit-maximising firms. We have also shown that the result
holds only if union-firm bargaining is decentralized. Under centralized
(industry-wide) bargaining, there is no wage moderation effect
associated with an increase in the number of firms: this is because the
bargained wage is independent of firm numbers under industry
bargaining.
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